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Bringing people into the heart of constitutional design: 
The Irish Constitutional Convention of 2012-141  
 
David M. Farrell (University College Dublin) 
Clodagh Harris (University College Cork) 
Jane Suiter (Dublin City University) 
 
 
In late 2012 the Irish government took the long-anticipated step of establishing the 
Irish Constitutional Convention (www.constitution.ie), whose first formal session was 
held on the weekend of January 26-27 2013.  Internationally there have been plenty of 
examples over the years of the involvement of citizens in debates over constitutional 
reform, whether by giving them a voice in referendums or public initiatives or by 
allowing them to run for election as members of a convention (a recent example being 
Iceland’s Constitutional Council of 2011).  Ireland’s Constitutional Convention also 
included citizens as members, but it is the nature of how these citizens were selected 
to participate and how the process was run that is of particular interest. There are a 
small but growing number of cases in which governments have opted to follow 
‘deliberative principles’, selecting citizens at random rather than by election and 
managing the discussions along deliberative lines.   
 
Irish policy makers were influenced by the citizens’ assemblies on electoral reform in 
the Canadian provinces of British Columbia (2004) and Ontario (2007) and the Dutch  
1 An earlier version of this chapter was presented to the conference on ‘Constitutional Change 
and People’, at the University of Luxembourg, 12 2014.  We are grateful to the participants 
for their comments and feedback and to Akisato Suzuki for his research assistance.  We were 
members of the academic and legal team that supported the work of the Convention. 
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citizen’s forum (BürgerForum) of 2006 (Fournier et al. 2011).  In all these cases the 
citizen members were selected at random rather than running for election and 
deliberation was the modus operandi.  Together with the Irish Constitutional 
Convention these cases represent a new type of constitutional convention that is not 
covered by existing typologies (on these, see Wheatley and Mendez 2013): this new 
type is a constitutional convention as a ‘mini-public’ (Farrell 2014). 
 
The origins of the Irish Constitutional Convention 
Irish citizens are pretty accustomed to debates over changes to the county’s 
constitution. The ‘fixed’ nature of the constitution means that it requires a referendum 
to change, something that has been attempted 39 times since its promulgation in 1937 
placing Ireland third in Europe for the number of post-war referendums held.2 The 
referendum barrier means that constitutional reform is not something entered into 
lightly; but inevitably reform is unavoidable.3 Various governments – particularly 
over the past twenty years or so – have established processes to review the 
Constitution with a view to large-scale constitutional reform, including: the 1967 
review comprising parliamentarians; the 1982 review carried out by legal experts; and 
the 1995 Whitaker review by (mainly academic) experts from law, political science 
and social policy, which produced a telephone book-sized analysis of the constitution 
and recommended extensive revisions to it. However, despite the eminence of the 
membership no amendments emerged. It became a useful academic resource, but it 
failed politically. Later reviews were carried out by parliamentarians but again these 
have failed to have a significant impact. Where a referendum has taken place on an 
issue that an Oireachtas (Parliament) Committee on the Constitution has made a 
recommendation it is notable that the government ignored the wording recommended 
by the committee. 
 
 
2 See http://www.c2d.ch/index.php 
3 Many of the referendums to date have been the outcome of international obligations 
requiring constitutional amendment (principally due to EU Treaty reforms and the Northern 
Ireland peace process); others have resulted from social and political modernization requiring 
updates to a Constitution that had been written in a different age (e.g. removing a ban on 
divorce, lowering the voting age to 18; although in some prominent cases – notably the 
various abortion referendums – the referendums have sought to ‘defend against’ the march of 
social reform). 
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The context of the 2012-14 Convention was very different to anything Ireland had 
witnessed before. This Convention emerged out of a compromise between two 
parties, Fine Gael (centre right party) and Labour that came to power in the 2011 
‘electoral earthquake’, an election that occurred in the midst of the worst economic 
crisis in the State’s history and which was to see the electoral wipeout of Ireland’s till 
then long dominant Fianna Fáil party (Gallagher and Marsh 2011). Fine Gael and 
Labour had included in their election manifestos proposals for establishing citizen-
oriented fora to discuss possible constitutional reforms in a number of areas. In Fine 
Gael’s case the proposal was for a British Columbia style citizens’ assembly to 
consider electoral reform. Labour’s plan was for the establishment of a constitutional 
convention (made up of equal proportions of politicians, experts and ordinary 
citizens) to consider a root and branch review of the Irish Constitution. 
 
The outcome of the 2011 general election was the formation of a Fine Gael/Labour 
coalition, whose ‘Programme for Government’ sought to marry the sometimes quite 
disparate manifesto promises of both parties.  As regards the parties’ respective 
proposals relating to citizens’ assemblies and constitutional conventions, the 
coalition’s compromise resulted in the promise to establish a constitutional 
convention to examine eight specific issues: 
• Reduction of the Presidential term of office to five years; 
• Reduction of the voting age to 17; 
• Review of the Dáil (lower house of parliament) electoral system; 
• Irish citizens’ right to vote at Irish Embassies in Presidential elections; 
• Provisions for marriage equality; 
• Amendment to the existing clause in the Irish Constitution on the role of 
women in the home and encouraging greater participation of women in public 
life; 
• Increasing the participation of women in politics; and 
• Removal of the offence of Blasphemy from the Constitution. 
 The Parliamentary resolution that established the Convention also permitted it to propose other relevant constitutional amendments after the original eight 
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reports were completed, thereby giving the Convention some limited agenda setting powers. 
This somewhat eclectic mix of items, from the relatively mundane issue of the length 
of office of the Irish President (whose role is largely ceremonial) to the potentially 
explosive issue of marriage equality, merely reflected the decision of the inter-party 
negotiators to ‘park’ certain matters that were in their respective election manifestos 
that were unlikely to be resolved easily during their febrile and intense negotiations. 
They were up against the (largely media-driven) clock to conclude the negotiations 
and establish a government, so what better way to deal with these matters then wrap 
them all together and give them to the Constitutional Convention to consider. 
 
It was to take a further 18 months before the Constitutional Convention was finally 
established – at the end of 2012 – with its work programme starting in early 2013.  It 
was given a small budget (less than €1 million) when  compared with the British 
Columbian budget of CAN$5.5million and the Dutch Burgerforum’s €5.1 million and 
a deadline of one year to conclude its work (a deadline that was later extended by 
several months). 
 
Chaired by Tom Arnold (the former chief executive of the leading Irish international 
charity, Concern), the other 99 members of the Convention consisted of 66 citizens 
and 33 elected legislators (29 of these from the Irish Parliament and four from the 
Northern Ireland Assembly). Whereas the parties could determine by themselves how 
to select their members (with the parties’ allocations proportionate to their 
representation in parliament), the citizen members were selected at random by a 
survey company, which had a brief of ensuring that the membership was a fair 
reflection of the population in terms of gender, age, region, education and socio-
economic status – a tall order with just 66 individuals but one that was achieved 
(Suiter et al. 2016). To allow for the possibility of members not being available for all 
meetings, a list of substitute members was drawn up at the same time. 
 
The Work of the Convention 
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The Irish constitutional convention completed its work in February 2014 and it was 
formally wound down a month later.  In this section we say something about how it 
operated and what it did. 
 
Meetings took place roughly once a month and lasted for most of a weekend (all day 
Saturday and all Sunday morning), with members voting at the end of the weekend on 
what recommendations to make. As mentioned above, the mode of operation was 
‘deliberation’.  What this meant was that the 99 members (the chair being the 100th) 
were arranged in circular tables of eight (comprising a mix of politician and citizen 
members).  At each table there was a trained facilitator and a note-taker.  The role of 
the facilitator was to ensure that discussions kept to the point and were respectful, and 
that every member had an equal opportunity to speak. The table allocations were 
rotated after each weekend so that members were mixed around. 
 
The itinerary generally operated as follows (depending on the topic there was some 
variations from this): 
• Short (15 minute each) presentations by experts in the area (these varied for 
each topic) followed by questions and answers from the floor. Briefing 
documents were provided by the experts several days in advance so that the 
members had an opportunity to inform themselves as much as possible.  These 
‘plenary sessions’ were televised and live-streamed (and are available on the 
website at www.constitution.ie).  
• Small group deliberation in closed session (i.e. no cameras). 
• A plenary (open) session to hear feedback from the deliberation. 
• Presentations by a selection of advocacy groups. 
• More deliberation, feedback and plenary discussions (possibly with more 
expert involvement at this point) 
• Agreement on the ‘ballot paper’ (to determine the Convention’s 
recommendations on the topic). 
• The vote on the recommendations (decisions were made by majority vote). 
 
The Convention members proved quite inventive in stretching their remit beyond the 
narrow confines set by the government, starting at its January 2013 weekend 
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gathering – its first full meeting. There the Convention considered two themes, 
namely: whether to reduce the voting age to 17, and whether to reduce the President’s 
term of office from seven years to five. Having read the briefing materials, heard from 
experts and advocacy groups, and deliberated over the relevant arguments, the 
Convention members took decisions that undoubtedly went beyond their brief. 
Specifically, the Convention voted in favour of: 
• Reducing the voting age to 16 (the age proposed by many of the advocacy 
groups promoting a reduced voting age), not 17 (the age they were asked to 
consider);  
• Reducing the age of candidacy for presidential candidates; and 
• Giving citizens a direct role in the process of nominating Presidential 
candidates (The Convention voted against the proposal to reduce the 
Presidential term). 
 
This willingness to extend the agenda beyond the specific question set by government 
continued in all the remaining meetings.  By the end of its operation this was to result 
in no less than 40 specific recommendations 18 of which would require constitutional 
change (see appendix). 
 
How successful was the Irish Constitutional Convention? 
The launch of the Irish Constitutional Convention attracted little by way of positive 
reaction. It was met rather with a mix of indifference from the mass public, cynicism 
from the ranks of those members of the media commentariat who bothered to pay any 
attention to it, and howls of derision via social media. The criticisms of the 
Convention fell into three groups: its composition, its agenda, and its limited advisory 
role. How justified are these criticisms? 
 
Composition 
Let us start with the issue of how the Convention membership was comprised. The 
main point of contention here was over the mixing of ordinary citizens with elected 
politicians, the argument being that the latter would be likely to dominate the 
discussions and intimidate the citizen members.  This was very different from the 
Canadian and Dutch citizens’ assemblies that had followed the principle that 
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politicians should be excluded from the process. In these cases there were no 
politician members (indeed, politicians were screened out in the randomized process 
of recruiting members); politicians were not even invited to address the assembly.  
 
The intention behind this was to ensure that the process was independent of party 
politics and that there would be no dilution of its deliberative element. But questions 
were raised over the degree of realism in some of the output of the assemblies. As 
Ratner observes of the British Columbia citizens’ assembly (CA): ‘the exclusion of 
political voices from CA deliberations becomes grounds for criticism of their 
judgment’ (2008: 163). It also provided the political parties with a good excuse not to 
involve themselves with the referendum campaigns that followed in the cases of the 
British Columbia and Ontario citizens’ assemblies. None of the major parties 
campaigned in the referendums; they remained ‘completely silent’ throughout 
(Fournier et al. 2011: 109), as a consequence of which the referendum campaigns had 
great difficulty in drumming up voter interest. In effect, the parties were able to kill 
off awkward electoral reform proposals by simply ignoring them.  Patrick Fournier 
and his colleagues draw the following conclusion from this experience: 
With respect to the political parties, our findings are absolutely unequivocal. 
The parties were strikingly absent from the whole process. This itself raises 
important questions about the consequences of such a situation. The risk, of 
course, is that assembly members may not have fully appreciated the problems 
and opportunities that parties face under different electoral systems (2011: 111). 
 
Arguably the Irish government’s decision to include politician members in the ICC 
reduced this risk of political detachment, but it was hardly designed with this purpose 
in mind. The portends were not good: the many critics did not like the inclusion of 
political members.4 In the parliamentary debate on the resolution establishing the ICC 
opposition politicians raised concerns over how the politician members may ‘have an 
 
4 At a public seminar in the Royal Irish Academy in Dublin that was held on the eve of the 
establishment of the ICC, Ken Carty, the research director of the British Columbia citizens’ 
assembly speculated on whether including politicians might actually help to politically anchor 
the ICC. See video coverage here: 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3E6Z_AW3CRk&feature=youtu.be.  
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undue bearing on the deliberations’.5 Another deputy, Stephen Donnelly made the 
following, quite telling, observation: 
[A] mistake has been made in including politicians, although it might seem odd 
for a politician to say that. … [B]est international practice does not include 
elected representatives in constitutional conventions. Two of the best recognised 
speakers in the world on this matter are Archon Fung from the Harvard 
Kennedy School, under whom I had the privilege to study, and Ken Carty from 
the University of British Columbia in Canada. In their work in this field, they 
acknowledge that the presence of partisan influence can lead to distorted 
deliberations and outcomes. Professor Fung says that in deliberative democracy 
‘powerful participants may seek to improperly and unreasonably exclude issues 
that threaten their interests from the scope of deliberation’. 
 
There was every reason why such a concern might be raised.  At that point, there was 
no way of knowing how the ICC would operate; it was not inconceivable that the 
politician members – some of whom turned out to be very senior – might seek to 
establish rules of procedure more akin to the parliamentary styles of operation rather 
than deliberative procedures.6  The government resolution establishing the ICC was 
silent on the question of mode of operation, so anything was possible. There was also 
the fear that the politician members might seek to dominate the proceedings, being the 
first to the microphone, intimidating the citizen members. 
 
Both sets of concern spoke to the danger of politicians controlling the process – a 
danger that ultimately did not come to pass. This was for a number of reasons, two of 
which stand out in particular. First, the secretariat was careful when designing how 
the ICC should be managed to follow best practice in operating along deliberative 
lines including: complimenting open plenary sessions (that were live streamed) with 
private roundtable discussions; arranging members in mixed (politicians and citizens) 
groups at tables of eight (and rotating the memberships of tables from one meeting to  
5 Catherine Murphy, Dáil debate July 10, 2013. 
6 This was precisely the situation that occurred is the case of the Australian 1998 
constitutional convention – the only other such case (at least in modern times) of a convention 
whose membership comprised a mix of politicians and ordinary citizens. There the decision 
was taken to operate along normal parliamentary lines (for more, see Constitutional 
Convention 1998; Warhurst 1999; Williams 1998). 
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the next); and using trained facilitators to ensure that all members had an equal 
chance to contribute to discussions. 
 
Second, there was an important decision on Rules and Procedures made by the ICC 
members at its inaugural meeting. A notable feature of these rules was an agreement 
to take decisions (on the ICC’s recommendations) by secret ballot, in effect 
preventing any attempt by political parties to apply a party whip to their members. 
Based on these Rules and Procedures, the Chairman established a set of principles by 
which the ICC should operate, which he reminded members of on repeated occasions 
and which were included in his introduction to each of the ICC’s reports. The key 
mantras were: openness and transparency; fairness; ‘equality of voice’ and 
collegiality. 
 
[Figure 1 about here] 
 
Survey evidence indicates that the ICC was successful in ensuring that all members 
had a fair hearing and that no one group dominated the proceedings.  The members 
were surveyed before and after each meeting and the evidence throughout was that the 
bulk of members were satisfied with how things operated.  Figure 1 provides some 
sample survey evidence showing consistently strong agreement across all weekends 
that discussions were of a high quality and that members felt that received a fair 
hearing. 
 
A further advantage of having politicians among the ranks of the members is that it 
helped to dissipate the sense of ‘disconnect’ between the Convention and the political 
class that was so apparent in the cases of the Canadian and Dutch citizens’ assemblies 
where the political class quite deliberately stayed clear of the work of the citizens 
making it difficult for these assemblies to gain much political purchase. In the Irish 
case, on the contrary, there was a coterie of members of the political class that, if 
anything, became cheerleaders of the process – as witnessed during the parliamentary 
debates of Convention reports. 
 
Agenda 
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The second area of criticism was over the agenda of the Constitutional Convention, 
which was seen at the same time as too limited and overly crowded. The first point 
relates to the fact that the list of eight matters was too restrictive, not dealing with the 
fundamental issues of constitutional reform that many called for. More to the point, 
specific matters of constitutional reform that were also on the coalition government’s 
political reform agenda (e.g., children’s rights, or abolition of the upper house of 
Parliament) were not included on the list of items.  The criticism of the crowded 
nature of the agenda relates specifically to the fact that the Convention was given just 
12 months to conclude its work, with space and resources for just nine weekends of 
meetings. (In the end a further two months was added to the schedule.) 
 
Soon after its launch an editorial in Ireland’s best-selling daily newspaper, the Irish 
Independent, dismissed the ICC as ‘unelected and powerless’.7  The more cerebral 
Irish Times was even more condemnatory, accusing the government of ‘a political 
sleight of hand’. According to the editorial writer, the convention was ‘all form and 
little substance’.8 One of the Irish Times regular opinion writers, Noel Whelan 
referred to it as ‘one part Oireachtas [parliamentary] committee and two parts focus 
group’.9 A fellow opinion writer for the same newspaper, Fintan O’Toole, referred it 
(deliberatively) vaguely as ‘the phantom Citizens’ Union – the citizens’ assembly or 
people’s convention’. For O’Toole this was ‘not a comprehensive redesign of the 
Republic but a public chat about subjects selected in advance by the Government’.10 
 
The media were not alone in reacting negatively to the ICC. In the July 10 2012 
parliamentary debate on the government’s announcement of its establishment, 
opposition deputies were highly critical. The leader of Sinn Féin, Gerry Adams was 
unequivocal in seeing it as ‘minimalist, disjointed and piecemeal’.11 The party’s 
deputy leader, Mary Lou McDonald, was equally forthright: 
This convention could and should be a significant platform for constitutional 
reform. There should be a myriad of issues to be debated, including long  
7 ‘Fine words don’t do Collins justice’, Irish Independent (editorial), August 20 2012. 
8 Both quotes from ‘The way politics is done’, Irish Times (editorial), July 12, 2012. 
9 Noel Whelan, ‘Constitutional convention will have its remit severely pruned’, Irish Times, 
February 25, 2012. 
10 Both quotes from Fintan O’Toole, ‘Tammany Hall lives on in feeble reforms’, Irish Times, 
June 28, 2012. 
11 This and the next quote are from Dáil debates, July 10 2012. 
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awaited and fundamental political reform. Instead the convention is in real 
danger of becoming, as one commentator put it over the weekend, ‘a purgatory 
into which a selection of constitutional issues will be parked before being 
further delayed or diverted when they return to the parliamentary process. 
 
There is no disputing the point that the original agenda was far from comprehensive 
and certainly eclectic. But, as we have seen above, the members were very adept in 
finding ways to extend the remit of the Convention, resulting in no less than 40 
separate recommendations for reform (see appendix), included in the mix some quite 
significant proposals. Furthermore, in the parliamentary resolution that established the 
Convention it was explicitly stated that its work need not be limited to the eight 
themes it was set to consider.  The resolution stated that following completion of its 
deliberations on the eight themes it could then consider other possible areas for 
amendment. To that end, the Convention held nine regional meetings across the 
country (attended by almost 1000 people) and encouraged submissions for ‘any other 
amendments’ from civil society and the public more generally and in late 2013 
arranged a series of meetings around the country to allow members of the public to 
make a pitch for issues to be considered by the Convention.  In the end, there were 
800 public submissions covering a range of 30 possible topics. Having sought 
government approval for time for an additional meeting, the Convention was then in a 
position to allocate its final two weekends to discuss ‘any other amendments’. The 
800 submissions were grouped into topic areas, which the members then voted on, 
resulting in a decision that the final two topics were: Dáil reform (i.e. reform of the 
lower house of parliament) and whether to enshrine economic, social and cultural 
rights in the Constitution. 
 
Limited role 
The Convention members may have been inventive in stretching their list of agenda 
items, but ultimately the question that mattered was how the political elite would 
react, which takes us to the third area of criticism over the fact that the Convention 
could only make recommendations, that is that its role was advisory rather than 
declaratory. The recommendations of the Convention were sent back to government 
to consider rather than going directly to the people as referendum proposals – very 
different from what happened in British Columbia and Ontario where the proposals 
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were put directly to the citizens in referendums, creating a more legitimate democratic 
process by blending deliberative and direct forms of democracy and overcoming, as Saward argues, the deficiencies of each (2001). This leaves the final power with 
government to determine whether or not its recommendations will ever see the light 
of day in the form of referendum questions.  
 
But it seemed that it was not that easy for the government to sweep the 
recommendations under the rug. The government had given a specific undertaking to 
respond and in timely fashion by way of a formal ministerial statement to the 
Parliament within four months of receipt of a report by the Convention.  Based on the 
government’s response to the first three reports – which were all debated on schedule 
– there was some reason for optimism that the government was taking this process 
seriously.  These were the reports of the first three weekends of meetings that 
discussed: the voting age, the length of the presidential term of office (both of these 
items dealt with in Report No. 1), the role of women in the home and women in 
politics (both of these dealt with in Report No. 2), and marriage equality (Report No. 
3).  The reaction to these reports was as follows: 
• The government agreed to hold three referendums (that it said would be 
scheduled for early 2015) on: reducing the voting age to 16, reducing the age 
of presidential candidates, and – of greatest significance –marriage equality. 
• The other recommendations contained in these reports were referred either to 
the relevant Parliamentary committee or to a relevant government department 
task force for further consideration. 
 
But this early flutter of government interest was to dissipate over time: the delays in 
government response grew ever longer; some reports are still awaiting a response and 
(at the time of writing) as the date of the next election draws near there is now a real 
prospect that no response will be forthcoming to these.  There was also a subsequent 
government reversal on its commitment to holding a referendum on the voting age: 
this has since been deferred indefinitely. 
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The appendix table to this chapter provides details on the current state of play relating 
to the government’s responses to the ICC’s 40 recommendations. In summary, to 
date, of the 40 recommendations of the Convention: 
• Five have been accepted (two of these, resulting in referendums in may 2015); 
• Eight have been ‘parked’ by being sent for further consideration (which means 
that many will probably never see the light of day); 
• Four have been ignored (in the sense that the ministerial response to the 
relevant ICC report simply said nothing about these items); 
• Two have been given an ambiguous response, to put it at its most charitable 
(these relate to the proposals for referendums on voting age and blasphemy, 
which the government appears to have accepted but have not set a date for the 
referendum); 
• Five have been rejected; and  
• 16 have yet to be responded to (mostly relating to the final two reports of the 
Convention that have been awaiting – for a very long time, indeed – any kind 
of government reaction). 
 
This summary presents a pretty mixed picture: the most charitable way of looking at 
this is that the government has given a relatively positive reaction to about a third of 
the ICC’s recommendations (that is if we add together those that have been accepted, 
parked or given an ambiguous response); but perhaps a more realistic assessment is 
that only five of the 40 recommendations have actually been accepted with action 
following (representing 12.5% of the total)  
 
Conclusion 
As a process, the Irish Constitutional Convention was a great success (Suiter et al. 
2016), but in terms of its outcomes it is still too soon to provide definitive judgement.  
The government’s responses to date have undoubtedly been mixed, but it did at least 
proceed in holding the two promised referendums – on marriage equality and the age 
of presidential candidates – both on the same day (May 22 2015).  As might be 
expected the former item completely overshadowed the latter both in terms of media 
coverage and campaign interest by political parties and wider civil society.  As a 
consequence and without any surprise the presidential age referendum was heavily 
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defeated.  But the marriage equality referendum passed successfully and by an equally 
resounding margin – thus marking the first case in the world of a successful policy 
outcome resulting from a process of deliberation (Elkink et al. 2015). In this sense at 
least we can judge the Irish Constitutional Convention to have been successful in 
terms of outcomes. 
 
Across the world’s established democracies, the trend in recent years has been 
towards engaging with citizens, of increasing the scope for ordinary citizens to have a 
say.  Initiatives like the British Columbia, Ontario and Dutch citizens’ assemblies and 
the Irish Constitutional Convention can be seen as illustrative of this ‘democratic 
transformation’ (Cain et al. 2003; Farrell 2014). Processes such as this form a 
potential part of the ‘ecology’ of democratic institutions, as a complement to our 
representative institutions (Warren 2013). They are, of course, not without their 
weaknesses, but what cannot be denied is that at their heart they represent a serious 
intention by the political elite to re-engage with society, and they are a step towards a 
form of democracy that seeks to place the citizen centre stage. 
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Figure 1: Attitudes of members to participation in the Convention 
 
 
Source:  Weekend surveys of Convention members (response rate generally about 
60%) 
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Appendix: Outcome of the Irish Constitutional Convention (as of May 2015) 
Topics Convention’s recommendations Outcome 
1. Reduction of 
the Presidential 
term of office to 
five years and the 
alignment with 
local and 
European 
elections 
1. No change to length of the Presidential term 
of office 
Government accepted 
2. *Reduce the age of candidacy for 
Presidential candidates 
Government accepted. 
Referendum held on May 
22 2015 (rejected) 
3. *Give citizens a say in the nomination 
process for presidential candidates 
Government rejected 
2. Reduction of 
the voting age to 
17 
4. *Voting age should be reduced to 16 Government accepted; 
then rescinded. Position 
ambiguous 
3. Clause on role 
of women in 
home & 
encouraging 
greater 
participation of 
women in public 
life 
5. *Article 41.2 (on the role of women) should 
be made gender-neutral to include other 
carers both ‘in the home’ and ‘beyond the 
home’ 
Government established 
task force. Still awaiting 
its report. 
6. Re a.41.2.2 (the state’s support for carers) 
the state should provide ‘a reasonable level 
of support’ 
Government established 
task force. Still awaiting 
its report. 
4. Increasing the 
participation of 
women in politics 
7. *The Constitution should be amended to 
include an explicit provision on gender 
equality 
Government established 
task force. Still awaiting 
its report. 
8. There should be more government action to 
encourage greater participation of women in 
politics 
Government established 
task force. Still awaiting 
its report. 
9. *The Constitution should be amended to 
include ‘gender-inclusive’ language 
Government established 
task force. Still awaiting 
its report. 
5. Provisions for 
same-sex 
marriage 
10. *The Constitution should be amended to 
allow for same-sex marriage 
Government accepted. 
Referendum held on May 
22 2015 (passed) 
11. The state should enact laws incorporating 
necessary changed arrangements in regard to 
the parentage, guardianship and upbringing 
of children 
Government accepted; 
legislation on adoption 
passed 
6. Review of the 
Dáil electoral 
system 
12. The electoral system should be amended to 
ensure that the smallest constituency size is a 
5-seater  
Government rejected this 
13. The electoral system should be amended to 
remove the alphabetical order of candidates 
on the ballot paper 
Electoral Commission 
should look into this 
14. The state should establish an Electoral 
Commission 
Government accepted; 
public consultation in 
progress 
15. Polling hours/days in should be extended Electoral Commission 
should look into this 
16. There should be greater access to postal 
voting 
Government ignored this 
17. Accuracy of the electoral register should be 
improved 
Government ‘agreed’, but 
committed to nothing new 
 18 
18. Introduce measures to increase electoral 
turnout 
Government ‘agreed’, but 
committed to nothing new 
19. Education programmes should be introduced 
in schools 
Government ‘agreed’, but 
committed to nothing new 
20. *There should be non-parliamentary 
ministers in government 
Government rejected this 
proposal 
21. *Members of the Dáil should be required to 
resign their seats on being appointed to 
ministerial office 
Government rejected this 
proposal 
22. *Citizen-initiatives should be introduced (for 
influencing parliamentary agenda and for 
calling of referendums) 
Government rejected this 
proposal 
7. Irish citizens’ 
right to vote at 
Irish Embassies 
in Presidential 
elections 
23. *Rights for citizens abroad and citizens in 
Northern Ireland to vote in presidential 
elections 
Government response 
expected imminently 
8. Removal of the 
offence of 
Blasphemy from 
the Constitution 
24. *The offence of blasphemy should be 
replaced by a new general provision to 
include incitement to religious hatred 
Government accepted; 
referendum promised but 
no date set 
25. Sec.36 of the defamation act should be 
replaced by detailed legislative provisions to 
include religious hatred 
Government to give this 
‘more consideration’ 
9. Dáil reform 26. *Constitutional reform to enhance the status 
of the office of Ceann Comhairle 
No response so far 
27. *Constitutional reform to elect the CC by 
secret ballot 
No response so far 
28. *Include references to Dáil committees in 
the Constitution 
No response so far 
29. *Amend art. 17.2 (re. government prior 
approval for expenditure proposals) 
No response so far 
30. The existing Dáil Reform Committee (DRC) 
should include external members and former 
TDs 
No response so far 
31. The DRC should bring forward proposals for 
genuine Dáil reform 
No response so far 
32. Introduction of family friendly hours No response so far 
33. CC to chair a forum to set the Dáil agenda No response so far 
34. Proportional allocation of committee chairs 
and secret ballot for their election 
No response so far 
35. More technical and professional resources to 
the committees 
No response so far 
36. The Working Group of Committee Chairs 
should be given the power to call the 
Taoiseach 
No response so far 
37. Introduce committee weeks No response so far 
38. More ‘free votes’ on Dáil and committee 
business 
No response so far 
10. Economic, 
social and 
cultural rights 
39. *Constitutional amendment to strengthen the 
protection of ESC rights; that this be realized 
progressively, subject to maximum available 
resources and that this be justiciable  
No response so far 
40. *In amending the Constitution, specific 
additional rights should be enumerated 
(housing, social security, etc.) 
No response so far 
* Indicates those recommendations that should require a referendum to implement (18 by our 
estimation) 
 
 
